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Abstract 
 
In this paper we examine the role of institutions relative to economic performance, absolute geography and financial 
performance of a country. In order to do this, we use the spatial principal component analysis and a spatial canonical 
correlation analysis to obtain multi-dimensional measure of institutions, economic performance, absolute geography 
and financial performance of countries. Our analysis shows that the first canonical functions in all the cases give us 
results that conform to current literature. That is, we find that a higher level of development is correlated to a higher 
level of institutional quality, deeper financial structure as well as "good" geography of the Jeffery Sachs variety. 
From the second canonical functions we find that economic growth is correlated to market steering. We further find 
that geographic conditions need not define the institutional set up of countries. A similar institutional set up need not 
result in a similar financial structure in countries. We show that there is a necessity to take spatial interactions with 
neighbouring countries into account while analysing the relationships between institutions, geography, economic 
and financial performance of a country. We find that space indeed has a strong influence on the prevailing 
institutional and economic conditions of countries. While the impact of space on geography is very obvious, we find 
that it has no bearing on the financial performance of countries.  
Keywords: economic performance; institutional quality; financial performance; geography; spatial principal 
components analysis; spatial canonical correlation analysis: spatial concentration 
JEL Codes: O10, O16, O17, O43, R12, R15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Explaining uneven economic development among countries has been a primary concern of empirical growth 
literature. Growth performance of countries is often explained in the context of convergence or divergence, given 
their wide-ranging ‘initial conditions’. One such strand of literature that has taken centre stage in explaining these 
differences is new institutional economics (NIE). According to NIE, differences in institutional quality and 
governance structures3 explain growth differentials among countries4 (Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2004), 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002, 2005), Rodrik et al.(2004)).  
 
Institutions refer to formal rules (constitutions, laws and regulations, political systems etc.) and informal rules 
(value systems, beliefs, social norms etc.) that humans use when interacting within a wide variety of repetitive and 
structured situations at multiple levels of analysis (North 2005, Ostrom 2005). Institutions are categorised into 
economic (property rights, presence of markets, regulatory structures etc.), political (constitutional arrangement) and 
social institutions (presence of health care markets, unemployment support systems, pension provision systems, and 
other informal social institutions such as social norms, religious norms etc.) (Bennedsen et al.2005).  
 
Although there is no absolute definition for “good governance” most include the depth of democracy and public 
accountability, bureaucracy and judiciary, stability of property rights, corporate governance, financial institutions, 
social welfare and labour institutions (Chang 2002, Khan 2004). In other words, it is how the social and economic 
environment of a country is managed (World Bank 1992:1)5.  
 
Studies in this area establish that there is a definite causal link between institutions and economic development 
directly and a link between geography and economic development via their influence on institutions (Rodrik et al. 
2004, Easterly and Levine 2003, etc.). These studies have helped establish a stylised fact that better institutions are 
strongly related to higher economic development. Most of these studies tend to use GDP per capita as the single 
most important measure of economic development. GDP per capita is no doubt an important indicator of economic 
development. However, most economists would agree that it does not help paint a complete picture of a country’s 
level of development. In this paper, we would like to use a broader set of indicators to measure the economic 
performance of a country, in order to re-examine the relationship between development, institutions and geography. 
Geographic determinism and international trade as the key drivers of growth in a country are the other two strands of 
literature that stand out. The former states that geographic differences (environmental differences) determine 
development differences in a country. It states that geography (climate, natural resources, disease ecology, etc.) 
determines not only the capacity of food production, but also labour productivity6, and trade policies of a country7. 
The latter states that international trade is the key driver of productivity and thus has a direct impact on the growth 
of a country8. Some studies have tried to evaluate which of these competing hypotheses gains ‘primacy’ over the 
others in explaining the ultimate driver of growth and development9. 
 
Geography is often considered as the most exogenous factor that can be used in econometric studies. Geographic 
determinism primarily enters literature in the form of its ‘absolute location’. By this we mean the physical 
                                                          
3 Although, institutional quality, institutions and governance do not mean the same, they are often used interchangeably. In this paper too, we use 
them interchangeably. 
4 It is understood in NIE that the ‘quality’ of institutions is determined by how strongly property rights are protected and how “free” markets are, 
i.e., stronger property rights laws and “freer markets” imply higher quality of institutions (Chang 2011). 
5 See Section 2.1 for the formal definition. 
6 The prevalence and incidence of diseases (like malaria, HIV) are much higher in tropical countries and thus burdensome not only in terms of 
costs incurred for treatment but also in  its debilitating effect on labour, often reducing labour productivity (Bloom and Sachs 1998, Sachs 2001, 
Gallup and Sachs 2001 etc.) 
7 Landlocked economies tend to have lesser trade openness and higher transport costs. Countries that  have a coast line tend to have lower 
transport costs as well as policies that encourage  international trade, thus allowing them more growth opportunities (Mellinger, Sachs and Gallup 
1999) 
8 Frankel and Romer (1999), Dollar and Kraay (2003) etc. 
9  These include Rodrik et al.(2004), Easterly and Levine (2003), Rodrik (2003) etc. 
geographic characteristics of a country, like its climatic conditions, physical endowments etc., which determine the 
ability of a country to develop. Geography in this form is discussed as an ultimate determinant of economic 
development. In recent years however, with the emergence of literature on regional convergence, geography in the 
form of its ‘relative location’ has been gaining importance. ‘Relative location’ refers to the relative spatial 
characteristics of a country, namely, its neighbouring countries and their influence on it (Abreu et al. 2004)10.  In this 
paper, we would like to use both these concepts. In particular, we would like to see the impact of physical geography 
and institutions on economic growth, given the relative location of countries and their influence on each other. We 
do this with the help of a canonical correlation analysis, which allows us to correlate one set of variables against 
another set of variables. 
 
The aim of this paper is to understand the interactions between institutions, economic performance, financial 
performance and the geography of a country from a spatial perspective. The analysis aims at understanding the 
underlying spatial patterns of institutions when summarised in combination with geography, economic performance 
or financial performance of countries. We do so by using a new method of spatial canonical correlation analysis, 
which is explained below.  We describe these spatial patterns at a cross-country level, looking specifically at what 
factors in the two sets of data commonly result in spatial clusters. Rather than entering the debate on the primacy of 
absolute geography or institutions as determinants of economic performance, we want to see how each of these 
phenomena interacts with the other in a broader context. This paper does not try to address the causality between 
institutions and economic development but rather provide a descriptive overview of the spatial patterns. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of related literature. Section 3 
describes the empirical methodology and the data used. Section 4 explains the results and the last section concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
2.1. Institutions and Economic Development 
 
Literature on institutions and economic growth and development has regained popularity over the last two decades. 
The predominant discourse in this literature states that institutions that ensure freer working of markets (read as the 
least amount of government intervention) as well as strong property rights protection provide the best environment 
for economic development (Chang 2011). According to the current literature, “good institutions” create an 
environment for providing the “right” incentives to agents in the economy. These incentives lead to learning and 
innovation, investment in human and physical capital as well as capabilities. These factors lead to higher growth 
rates in an economy. An improper or a bad institutional set up, on the other hand, does not incentivise such 
activities. Instead, it leads to corruption, rent-seeking and other non-productive or growth repressing activities.  
There are numerous studies based on the institutions hypothesis. “Core” papers in this area of research include 
Acemoglu et al. (2002, 2005), Rodrik et al. (2004) Easterly and Levine (2003), Hall and Jones (1999) etc., among 
others. All these studies examine how various institutions effect economic growth and development outcomes, 
concluding that institutions matter. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), use settler mortality rates of the colonisers in the colonies as an 
instrument for institutional quality during the colonial period. They hypothesise that Europeans took their 
institutions to ‘settler colonies’, while they set up different ‘extractive’ institutions in colonies where the prime 
intention was extraction of wealth. Thus, colonies where they settled got better institutions and those where they had 
an extraction policy ended up with bad institutions. These historical conditions further influenced the quality and 
type of current institutions. They find a strong and significant influence of historical institutions from the colonial 
era on current institutions as well as of current institutions on per capita income. Hall and Jones (1999), use 
“distance from equator” and the “extent of to which Western languages are spoken in the country” as instruments to 
find a strong correlation between output per worker with respect to social infrastructure (which is an average of an 
institutions and openness of economy index). Kauffman et al. (1999) also use “extent of to which Western languages 
                                                          
10 ‘Absolute location’ and ‘relative location’ are often referred to as ‘first nature’ geography and ‘second nature’ geography of a country. 
are spoken in the country” to find a positive and significant impact of the quality of institutions on growth. Other 
cross-country studies like Mauro (1995), Easterly and Levine (2003), Dollar and Kraay (2003) also support the 
hypothesis that institutions generate development. In fact, there are but a few studies that do not find any significant 
effect11. 
The proponents of the institutional hypothesis agree that institutions have evolved endogenously, depending on the 
country’s geographic conditions, among other factors. Examples of such studies include Hall and Jones (1999), 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), Rodrik et al. (2004). These studies have made empirical efforts to explain the possible 
linkage between geography and institutions. Hall and Jones (1999) hypothesise that Western Europeans preferred to 
live in places that resembled their own, and thus indirectly use geography as an explanatory variable. Engerman and 
Sokoloff (1997) suggest that the climatic conditions either ‘lent themselves’ to plantation agriculture or small farm 
agriculture. This in turn meant that the plantation economies led to less democratic power relations and small farms, 
by empowering a larger section of society led to more democratic institutions and thus to more development. Rodrik 
et al. (2004) and Easterly and Levine (2003) find that geography influences economic growth development only via 
its impact on institutions. 
Much of this literature has not been sensitive towards the individual development experiences of countries. Most of 
these theories “have been rooted in the historical and social experiences of a few Western industrialized countries” 
(Brohman 1995). Policy prescriptions of growth have thus been a set of generalised recommendations, irrespective 
of their applicability to culture or the varying historical conditions of each country (that are most often very different 
from the Western European conditions). While it is important to understand growth at a more general level, policies 
made towards encouraging growth and development need to be made at the country level, catering to the specific 
conditions of the economy. The failure of the Washington Consensus has further proved that we need to look 
beyond the “one size fits all” approach. 
  
2.2 Geography and Economic Development 
 
The geography hypothesis is based on the fact that not all the areas in the world are endowed in the same fashion. 
The geography of a country determines characteristics such as soil quality which directly affects agricultural 
productivity, natural resources which contribute to wealth as well as provide the raw material base for industrial 
activity, topography which contributes to costs of transportation, climate that affects the productivity of workers, 
and the disease environment which also directly affects the productivity of workers (Acemoglu 2009). No access to 
rivers, as well as land-locked geography, affects the growth of the country negatively. The proponents of this view 
argue that during and after colonisation the poor countries have remained poor. There has been no reversal of 
fortunes and what has remained the same is the geographical position of these countries (Sachs (2001) and Bloom 
and Sachs (1998)). Thus, it is primarily geography, which determines the economic situation of the country.  
There have been many empirical studies carried out to determine the importance of geography as a determinant of 
growth. The latitude of the country is a popular variable in testing the geography-development hypothesis. Sala-i-
Martin (1997 a, b), Bloom and Sachs (1998), Easterly and Levine (2001) are among some of those studies that find a 
positive and significant impact of the latitudinal position of a country on its growth levels. The numbers of frost 
days in a year, availability of arable land, the length of the coastline, rainfall, and temperature have been other 
variables used to study the effect of geographical position of the country on its growth rates. Some of the papers that 
test these variables empirically are Masters and Sachs (2001) and Bloom et al. (2003). All these find a positive and 
significant effect of the first three variables on growth, while the last two variables are found to have a negative and 
significant effect. That is to say, lesser and more unpredictable rainfalls as well as high temperatures directly affect 
the productivity as well as output negatively. Landlocked economies have been tested to find a negative impact on 
growth (Easterly and Levine (2001), Gallup and Sachs, (1999)). Easterly and Levine (2003), and Sachs (2003) also 
use measures such as the proportion of the population at the risk of malaria, life expectancy at birth, infant mortality 
rate etc., to find a significant and negative impact of disease ecology on growth. McArthur and Sachs (2001), 
concludes that institutions and geographically-related variables affect the GNP per capita of countries.  
                                                          
11 For example, Dollar and Kraay (2003) find a positive and insignificant effect between “rule of law” and growth, while Sala-i-Martin (1997 a) 
finds ethno-linguistic fractionalisation on growth as insignificant.  
The results of the empirical studies mentioned above find that the geography does indeed have an impact on the 
country’s growth statistics. As mentioned earlier the geography-development hypothesis is mainly based on the 
‘absolute location’ of a country. That is, they consider those characteristics of a country’s geography which are 
exogenous, time-invariant (except for some disease variables) and are not influenced by its ‘relative location’ vis-à-
vis its neighbours and their socio-political and economic conditions. 
 
2.3. Spatial econometrics and Economic Development 
 
The impact of the ‘relative location’ of a country on the quality of institutions and thus economic growth has been 
given relatively less attention. How does the institutional quality of a country get affected by the institutional quality 
of its neighbours? A large literature on spatial dependence in the field of economic growth can be found in the 
regional convergence literature. Regional income convergence on intra-national scale, as well as regional scale, has 
resulted in strong consensus on income convergence among these geographical units. The theories of technology 
diffusion and factor mobility have strong spatial components. For example, Verspagen (2010), López-Bazo et al. 
(1998, 2004) study the technology diffusion and growth among European regions. Similarly Rey and Montouri 
(1998) study spatial patterns in income across the states of USA. Other studies in this literature include Quah (1997), 
Cheshire and Magrini (2008), Fingleton, and López-Bazo (2006), etc.  
Spatial dependence with respect to institutions and governance has been addressed in a couple of studies. Ward and 
Gleditsch (2008) study the spatial spillover effect of democracy at a cross-country level. They find southern, and 
western Africa, as well as India, are unusual situations where in democracy in their country is not explained by the 
situation in their neighbouring countries. Examining if the governance structures in an economy are influenced by 
their neighbouring countries could help unbundle institutions in a more effective way.  They find a positive impact 
of democracy of neighbouring countries. Leeson and Dean (2009), Sobel and Leeson (2007), etc., also study the 
effects of democracy on neighbouring countries, with a spatial or a temporal lag (Hosseini and Kaneko 2012). 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
Institutional quality, geography, economic performance and the financial structure of a country are all multi-
dimensional in nature. Using single variables to describe these phenomena can bias understanding of how they 
influence each other12. In this paper, we want to better understand how the geography of a country (its ‘absolute 
location’), its economic performance and its financial structure, each in turn, are related to the institutional set up of 
a country (given its relative location). In order to understand the role of ‘relative geography’ of countries, we 
introduce an alternate method of spatial principal component analysis and spatial canonical correlation analysis. 
We would like to study the dependence of one latent variable on the other, given the relative location of the 
observations, i.e., we would like to account for the spatial dependence of observations in one country on its 
neighbours13.  
Similar to the Principal Component Analysis (PCA), canonical correlation analysis (CCA) is a dimensionality 
reduction method. PCA transforms a set of probably correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables. 
This is done by constructing a new set of latent variables that are orthogonal (uncorrelated) to each other. In other 
words, the new variables are weighted linear combinations of the original variables, which maximise the variance of 
the new latent variables in the data set, called principal components. While the PCA does this for one set of 
variables, the CCA finds the relationship between two sets of multiple variables X and Y, for which we obtain two 
sets of latent vectors. These are called canonical components. The weights are obtained in such a way that they not 
only reduce the number of variables in each data set, but also maximise the correlation between the corresponding 
new components in each dataset (i.e., the first component in data set 1 is maximally correlated to the first component 
in data set 2 and so on. Each pair of components is together called a canonical function)14. The residual variance is 
explained by each successive canonical function that is, the first function explains the most amount of variance in 
                                                          
12 Verspagen, B., (2012), explores the relationships between governance, institutions and economic development measuring them multi-
dimensionally. 
13 For a detailed explanation on the methodology used see (Bhupatiraju et al.2013) 
14 This is different from the PCA in that the correlations are found within one set of data and not the inter-correlations between two sets of data. 
the data and consecutive ones explain the maximum of residual variance. The highest number of components you 
can have is determined by the number of original variables in the smaller data set. 
The analysis results in following results for PCA and CCA respectively: (i) factor loadings (or canonical loadings) 
for both sets of data (X and Y), for each common pattern that exists in the two sets (for each canonical function). 
These weights correspond to each of the variables in the data sets, determining how they weigh in on the identified 
common pattern. With the factor loadings we can identify the structural pattern underlying the data (Clark 1975). 
These loadings are obtained from the correlation matrix, by the means of Eigen value decomposition. (ii) Factor 
scores (or canonical scores) for each of the data sets (X and Y). These scores explain how each country fares in the 
common pattern. This, is therefore, a good indication of the spatial patterns underlying the data. The scores are 
obtained by pre-multiplying the loadings with the standardized raw data. (iii) Canonical correlation coefficient 
(Moran coefficient) is the correlation coefficient between the latent variables of both sets of data (for each canonical 
function). It can be understood as the Pearson r coefficient between the two latent variables. The spatial correlation 
between the two factor score vectors is equal to the square root of the corresponding Eigen values. 
We want to maximize the correlation coefficient obtained from the PCA and CCA to explain a maximized overall 
spatial pattern. We call this the spatial correlation coefficient. In order to do this, we introduce spatial weights (a 
connectivity matrix) that allow us to define the ‘relative location’ of the countries in the data sets15. We first 
calculate the spatial lag of one set of variables. A spatial lag of observation i of variable y (yi) is the linear 
combination of values of its neighbouring countries and is given by ∑ ݓ௜௝ݕ௜௡௝ , where wij is the spatial weight matrix. 
This is the weighted average of the observation i’s neighbouring countries (j). In other words, a spatial lag 
introduces a diffusion process such that the variables in the data set are influenced by their neighbours. This method 
decomposes a spatially weighted matrix, in order to give it an explicit spatial perspective. Bhupatiraju et al. (2013) 
explains this methodology in detail. We perform a spatial PCA on the institutional data in order to reduce the 
number of institutional variables, which we further use for a spatial CCA along with the other data sets. 
 
In order to obtain the spatial lag, we choose a set of geographic distance weights for the connectivity matrix. We use 
an exponential decay to obtain the weights matrix, given by the formula, ݓ௜௝ ൌ ݁ି଴.଴଴ଵହௗ೔ೕ where wij is the spatial 
weight between countries i and j, and dij is the bilateral distance between the centroids of the two countries. The data 
of bilateral distances are taken from the CEPII gravity dataset16. This specific distance decay has been chosen after 
having experimented with a few other weights, the details of which are presented in Appendix A. It is an arbitrary 
choice, but reflects a rapid decay of weights given the distance between the countries. This (nxn) matrix is row-
standardized so as to take into account that all countries are -at some distance- neighbours of each other and, 
therefore, is not symmetric. It is also important to note that the weights are non-stochastic and are exogenous to the 
model.  
The analysis is based on four datasets, which we will briefly present. The first dataset Institutional Profiles 
Database, 2009 version (IPD)17 provides us with the data on institutional characteristics of 123 countries. The IPD 
data is divided into four institutional sectors and nine institutional functions. The categories will be presented in  
Appendix B. For our analysis we use the two-digit aggregation level which has 93 variables.  
The data on physical geographic factors of countries are taken from the Gallup, Mellinger and Sachs geography 
dataset18. The dataset contains information on infectious diseases, general measures of geography and agricultural 
measures. This particular data set has been divided into two different sets for our analysis, one describes the physical 
geographic characteristics of countries (GEOAREA) and the second describes the soil quality related variables 
(GEOSOIL), mainly based on the Köppen-Geiger climate zones. The information on infectious diseases has been 
dropped out of this analysis (since they are time-varying and are affected by policy and is not necessarily exogenous 
as noted in the previous section). 
                                                          
15 For a detailed explanation refer to Wartenberg (1985) 
16Bilateral distances and common (official) language come from the CEPII distance database 
(http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm).  Mayer, T. & Zignano, S., (2011), "Notes on CEPII’s distances measures: The GeoDist 
database", CEPII Working Paper 2011-25, Paris: CEPII. 
17 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/institutions.htm 
18 http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/geographydata.htm 
 The data on economic variables are taken from the Penn World Table19 (PWT). We use a broader set of economic 
indicators to measure economic performance. These take into account not only the size of the economy (the initial 
level of GDP) and how fast it is growing (average annual growth rate of GDP per capita over the period of 2000-
2007), but also some indicators of its expenditures which include investment, government spending, and 
consumption. We also include an indicator of the economy’s trade openness as well as the log of population all 
using the definitions as in PWT. While GDP per capita is generally used as the measure of economic 
development/performance, we feel that these additional variables allow us to measure different dimensions of a 
country's economic situation. By including other aspects of the economy that leads to higher levels of growth  in a 
country, the aim is to go beyond the simple measure of GDP per capita as a measure of economic 
development/performance. 
The financial data is obtained from the Financial Structure database distributed by the World Bank20 (FINANCE). 
This is a database of 31 indicators that describe the financial development and structure of countries. We use data 
for the year 2009. The variables in the data measure the “size, activity and efficiency of financial intermediaries and 
markets” (Beck et al. 2000). Variables that measure the size and activity of non-bank financial institutions 
(insurance, private bond market and stock markets), international debt and remittances, as well as liquid liabilities of 
countries, have missing data for our set of countries. Due to this lack of data, we have dropped these 12 variables 
from the dataset21. We use 19 variables that give details of the banking sector across countries. The details of these 
variables are given in Appendix C. 
 
4. Empirical Results  
 
4.1. First stage results 
 
The IPD database contains 367 “elementary items” that are aggregated to 133 “three digit level” variables and 
further aggregated to 93 “two digit level” variables. For our analysis, we use the two-digit aggregation level which 
has 93 variables. Because there are very few degrees of freedom when we use the 93 variables for 118 countries, we 
would like to further aggregate these before our second step of the analysis. We use a pre-defined categorisation (of 
the 4 sectors) to obtain new latent variables for each of the sectors. Sector A which constitutes institutional variables 
related to public institutions, and civil society contains 36 two-digit level variables. Sector B which constitutes 
variables related to the goods and services markets contains 28 variables. Sector C constitutes 13 variables 
describing the capital market, and Sector D constitutes 16 variables describing institutional variables related to the 
labour market. We first do a spatial PCA on each of sectors of IPD. We select the new latent variables by looking at 
the scree plot of the Eigen values. Out of the components we obtain; we choose to work with 12 components (four 
from Sector A, three from Sector B, two from Sector C and three from Sector D). We discuss the results for some of 
these components before proceeding to the next step of the analysis.22   
We call the first PC of Sector A, A1. This component gives the highest positive weights to ‘Social Inclusion’ (A93), 
‘democracy, legality & freedom (A10)’, and ‘political proximity to an EU country’.  ‘Change and innovation’ and 
‘political proximity to Japan’ have strong negative loadings. This component in general can be interpreted as 
representing a ‘socially inclusive democracy’ with political proximity to an EU country. In other words, we can see 
that countries that function similar to the non-Anglo Saxon Western European economies obtain a higher score than 
others. It is interesting to note the Algeria and Libya also get a high score along with Canada. These are the only 
countries, not in the geographical region of Western Europe, which have a high score. 
                                                          
19 We use PWT (7) of the table. 
20 Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, (2000), "A New Database on Financial Development and Structure," World Bank 
Economic Review 14, 597-605. 
21 These are: other financial institutions assets / gdp (ofagdp), liquid liabilities (in mil. 2000 usd) (ll_usd), life insurance premium volume / gdp 
(inslife), non-life insurance premium volume / gdp (insnonlife), stock market capitalisation / gdp (stmktcap), stock market total value traded / gdp 
(stvaltraded), stock market turnover ratio (stturnover), no. of listed companies per 10k population (listco_pc), private bond market 
capitalisation/gdp(prbond), public bond market capitalisation / gdp (pubond), international debt issues/gdp (intldebt), loans from non-resident 
banks (net) / gdp (intldebtnet), remittance inflows / gdp, (remit). 
22 The loadings for the first-stage are given in the Appendix D. 
The second PC of Sector A is called A2 here. The variables that load high and positively in the second component 
are ‘Change and Innovation’, ‘Security of transactions & contracts’, and ‘political proximity to Japan’. ‘Institutional 
capacity’, ‘domestic public security & control of violence’ and ‘emulation of neighbouring countries’ are some other 
variables that have relatively high weights. ‘Governance of public administration & the justice system’23, 
‘government capacity to reform’, ‘autonomy in operation & creation of organisations’ and ‘decentralisation’ have 
strong negative loadings. The eastern part of the world has the highest scores in this component, along with 
Northern European countries. Africa and Latin America have the lowest scores along with Mediterranean Europe. 
This component can be interpreted as one that stresses on ‘society’s responsiveness to change and innovation’.  
The third PC of Sector A (A3) has high and positive loadings on ‘change & innovation’, ‘governance of public 
administration & the justice system’, ‘domestic public security & control of violence’, ‘traditional solidarity’, 
‘political proximity to China’, ‘social inclusion’, and ‘cooperative behaviour in society’. It has negative loadings on 
‘government capacity to reform’ (which has the strongest loading), ‘national cohesion’, ‘decentralisation’, ‘subsidies 
on commodities’ and ‘democracy, legality & freedom’. This component could be interpreted as stressing on the 
“strong presence of the government”. 
The last component that we consider from Sector A is A4. This constitutes of ‘security of transactions & contract’, 
‘capacity of state to co-ordinate stakeholders’, ‘institutional capacity’, ‘autonomy in creation and operation of 
organisations’, and ‘decentralisation’ which have positive loadings. Those variables that load negatively include 
‘social inclusion’, ‘political proximity to an EU country’, ‘governance of public administration & the justice 
system’, ‘control of state violence by NGO’s’, ‘strategic capacities’ as well as ‘subsidies on commodities’. While 
‘government capacity to reform is the strongest negative  loading on A3, ‘political proximity to an EU country’ 
along with ‘social inclusion’ is the strongest  negative loadings in A4 and ‘security of transactions’ has the highest 
positive loading in A4. Although it is hard to give a straight forward meaning to the fourth component, it gives the 
highest scores to economies that guarantee a security of transactions but are not necessarily socially inclusive. We 
notice a strong Mediterranean cluster. This component could be interpreted as stressing on the ‘security of 
contracts’.   
From Sector B, that has variables representing the goods and services market, we take three components. The first 
one, B1 loads positive on variables such as ‘land tenure- security of ownership’, ‘joint ventures’, ‘technical 
environment’, ‘privatisations’, ‘nationalisations’ and ‘land tenure- demand for land’. It loads strongly negative on 
‘non-national access to land’, ‘rural land tenure- traditional property rights’, ‘consideration of public interest in 
government- business relationships’ as well as ‘government recognition of various land tenure rights systems’. From 
this, it is obvious that the most important aspect of the goods & services market pertains to ‘security and 
enforcement of property rights laws’ in a country. From the scores, we find that the developed countries have the 
highest scores.  Kazakhstan and Turkey also obtain a high score and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa get the lowest 
scores.  
In the second component of Sector B, B2, the ‘importance of economic zones’, ‘technical environment’, ‘land 
tenure- security of ownership’, ‘considerations of public interest in government-business relations’, ‘shareholder 
weights – weight of the government’ and ‘openness to business’ have positive weights. ‘Non-national access to 
land’, ‘information on shareholders’, ‘ease of starting a business’, ‘density of sub-contracting relations’, ‘public aid 
for R&D’, ‘rural land tenure- traditional property’ and ‘land tenure- development policies’ load negatively. From the 
variables that load high -either positively or negatively- we see that the most important functions in this component 
are those pertaining to ‘strong presence of government regulation and active economic policies’ (in the goods and 
services market). This component could be understood as representing strong regulation by the government and 
having active economic policies pertaining to economic zones. Countries that score high on this factor include the 
Middle East, Central and South Asia as well a few African countries. 
The last component of Sector B, B3, loads high and positive on ‘privatisations’, ‘information on share-holders’, 
‘land tenure- demand for land’, ‘free movement of people and information’, ‘shareholders- weight of government’ 
and ‘land tenure- security of ownership’. Variables that load negatively on the component include ‘competition on 
the good & services market’, ‘importance of economic zones’, ‘governance of natural resources’, ‘rural land tenure- 
                                                          
23 Defined as the efficient public administration (which includes transparency in public accounts, economic policy and public procurement 
contracts, effective control of corruption) and an independent justice system (this includes the effectiveness of the fiscal system, justice system 
and of urban governance.) (de Crombrugghe, Farla, Meisel, de Neubourg, Ould Aoudia, Szirmai (2009)  
public property’ as well as ‘consideration of public interest in government-business relations’. Although it is hard to 
label this component based on the loadings, we find that the Americas along with Southern Africa and China get the 
lowest scores. Thus we label this component ‘strong competition in the goods market’  
We choose to retain only two components from Sector C. C1 constitutes variables like ‘regulation of competition in 
banking’, ‘importance of venture capital’, ‘monitoring and auditing in banking’, ‘financial openness’, 
‘nationalisation of the financial sector’ as well as ‘freedom in allocation of loans’ which load positively. ‘Micro 
lending’, ‘financial information’, ‘sovereign wealth fund policy’ and ‘competition within the banking system’ have a 
negative weight on the component. This component stresses on a ‘well developed free and open financial sector’. 
C2, the second component of Sector C, is almost a mirror image of the first component24. Of those variables that 
load positively in C1, ‘regulation of competition in banking’, ‘importance of venture capital’, ‘financial openness’ 
and ‘freedom of allocation of loans’ load negatively in C2. Of those variables that load negatively in C1, we find 
that ‘micro lending’, ‘sovereign wealth fund policy’ and ‘competition within the banking system’ show up positively 
in C2, along with ‘competence of bank executives’. This component stresses on a financial sector that is more or less 
controlled and regulated by the government, yet has a well-developed structure. We refer to this component as 
‘government regulated financial sector’. While the first factor emphasizes openness of the financial sector, the 
second one emphasizes strong government control over the financial sector. It is interesting to note that in both 
factors most of Africa gets low scores while Australia and Canada get high scores. While ‘monitoring and auditing 
in banking’ influences the first component, competence of bank executives influence the second.  
From Sector D, we retain three components. The first one, D1, loads positively high on ‘freedom of association & 
trade union pluralism’, and ‘distribution of income’ and negatively on ‘low incidence of child labour’, ‘social 
mobility’, ‘management of labour’, ‘weak employment contract rigidity’ as well as ‘retraining and re-skilling 
measures’. Lack of social mobility and incidence of child labour clearly dominate this factor. This component 
stresses on a ‘non-meritocratic weak labour market’ where there is discrimination based on gender, ethnicity etc., 
and one in which social mobility is based on connections rather than on merit. We find that most African countries, 
along with Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, India and Nepal score the highest. 
The second component D2 loads positively on ‘low incidence of child labour’, ‘weak employment contract rigidity’, 
‘social mobility: young higher education graduates’, ‘quality of the supply of public goods’, ‘strikes and wage 
bargaining at the individual level’. It loads negatively on ‘freedom of association & trade union pluralism’, 
‘flexibility of the labour market’, ‘adaptive education system’ and ‘management of labour’. This component stresses 
on a ‘flexible and adaptive labour market’.  
The last component from this sector, D3 loads high and positive on ‘low incidence of child labour’, ‘strikes’, 
‘management of labour’, ‘weak segmentation of the labour market’, and ‘freedom of association & trade union 
pluralism’ and negatively on ‘quality of supply of public goods’, ‘social mobility’, ‘distribution of income’ and 
‘social mobility: young higher education graduates’. This component stresses on a ‘weakly segmented labour 
market’. 
Looking at these factor loadings and factor scores, we find that among the first components, A1, B1 and C1 move it 
the same direction with very similar scores for each country while D1 moves in the opposite direction. Using these 
12 components from the IPD data set which we use as indicators of institutional quality, we now perform the spatial 
canonical correlation analysis along with a set of 7 economic variables (PWT). In the analysis that follows these 12 
components will be called the IPD variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 Since the two latent variables have to be orthogonal. 
Table 1: Labels for the first stage IPD components25 
Description Variable code 
‘socially inclusive democracy’ (with political proximity to an EU country) A1 
‘society’s responsiveness to change and innovation’ (with political proximity to Japan) A2 
‘strong presence of the government’ A3 
‘security of contracts’  A4 
‘security and enforcement of property rights laws’ B1 
‘strong government regulation and active economic policies’ (in the goods and services market)  B2 
‘strong competition in the good market’ B3 
‘well developed free and open financial sector’ C1 
‘government regulated financial sector’ C2 
‘non-meritocratic weak labour market’ D1 
‘flexible and adaptive labour market’ D2 
‘weakly segmented labour market’ D3 
 
  
                                                          
25 These labels are used to refer to each of the components. It should be noted however that these labels are not all encompassing in describing the 
details of the components. The reader might want to look at the details of the loadings provided in the Appendix. 
4.2. Second stage results 
 
Below we look the resulting correlations of IPD with the other data sets of economic variables (PWT), financial 
variables (FINANCE), and geographic variables of physical factors (GEOAREA) and soil quality (GEOSOIL). We 
start by looking at the correlations between institutional variables and the economic variables (IPD-PWT). 
 
A. Institutions and Economic Development (IPD-PWT): 
 
We extract three components and analyse them here. The scores of the first canonical component from IPD and 
PWT are plotted in Figure 1a. The spatial correlation is 0.77. There are clear clusters of African countries, most of 
which are in the third quadrant, scoring low on both institutional and economic development variables. We also find 
most of the Asian countries around the origin, along with the Middle Eastern countries. In the first quadrant and 
close to the origin we find the Latin American countries and further up, scoring high on both institutional and 
economic variables we find the developed countries.  
 
 
Figure 1a: Spatial correlation between institutions and economic performance (factor 1) 
 
We can use the loadings to understand characteristics underlying the factors. On the IPD side, we find that ‘socially 
inclusive democracy’ (A1), ‘Society’s responsiveness to change and innovation’ (A2) and ‘enforcement of property 
rights laws’ (B1) load positively while ‘strong presence of the government’ (A3) and ‘non-meritocratic weak labour 
market’ (D1) load strongly negative. For the PWT data the first component loads positively on all variables except 
population growth rate which loads strongly negative. It loads strongly positive on the initial level of GDP, as well 
as on consumption. Growth rates, openness of the economy and investment load positive but low. This component 
can be interpreted as representing the level of economic development of countries. It captures rich countries which 
have a high level of initial GDP, high level of consumption and positive but not high growth rates. 
The first canonical function thus emphasizes the relationship between proper functioning of political institutions, 
relatively high level of freedom and public rights, legality and legitimacy, the State’s capacity to bring about a 
convergence of interests, authorities’ strategic vision and high capacity to absorb new technology and  high initial 
level of GDP, as well as high consumption in a country. The first components seem to capture the well-known and 
widely accepted correlation between institutions and level of GDP per capita. The relative position of the country 
clearly has an impact on its score. 
Figure 1b shows the factor scores of institutional quality for the 118 countries. In general, there is a high level of 
clustering. The cluster with the highest scores is the developed country cluster. The cluster with the second highest 
set of scores is Latin America, Eastern Europe and Russia as well as some countries in North Africa (which could be 
due to their loadings on the variable ‘political proximity to the EU’). The next cluster constitutes the Middle East, 
South and South East Asia and four Latin American countries. The least institutional scores are given to Sub-
Saharan Africa. From a strictly spatial perspective, Australia and New Zealand are the outliers. Figure 1c shows the 
scores of economic performance which more or less corresponds to the institutional variable scores. The maps show 
that countries like Australia, New Zealand, the Indian sub-continent and Northern Africa have better institutions 
relative to their economic performance. Countries like Japan and South Africa have a better economic performance 
given relative to their institutional set up. In other words, the institutional scores capture the western European 
model of institutions for this function. 
 
 
Figure 1b: IPD scores Factor 1 (IPD-PWT) 
 
 
Figure 1c: PWT scores Factor 1 (IPD_PWT) 
 
The spatial correlation for the second canonical function (0.48) is significantly smaller than the first. On the IPD 
side, ‘security and enforcement of property rights laws’ (B1), ‘strong government regulation and active economic 
policies’ (B2) and ‘flexible and adaptive labour market’ (D2) are among those that load positively and ‘socially 
inclusive democracy’ (A1) loads strongly negative. The PWT data loads strongly positive on growth rate and 
investment. It loads negatively on the initial level of GDP, consumption and government spending. Openness is 
positive but with a relatively low weight. Initial level of GDP has a negative weight along with government 
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spending. We can say that this component identifies “catching-up” countries, with a market steering government. 
Figure 2a shows the scatter plot of the scores for 2nd function. We see that there are spatial clusters but not as strong 
and clear as in the first factor. We find countries like Qatar, China, Oman, etc., at the higher end of the plot and most 
African countries, Haiti and Cuba at the lower end.  
 
Figure 2a: Spatial correlation between institutions and economic performance (factor 2) 
 
Figure 2b maps the institutional scores and Figure 2c maps the scores of economic performance. From the two 
maps, we can see that there is very close spatial correspondence between the two sets of scores in the Eastern part of 
the world. This is not the case among African, Western European and Latin American countries between the two 
sets of scores.  
 
Figure 2b: IPD scores Factor 2 (IPD-PWT) 
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Figure 2c: PWT scores Factor 2 (IPD-PWT) 
 
The variables that have high positive loadings in the third loadings vector of IPD are ‘security of contracts’ (A4), 
‘strong presence of the government’ (A3) and ‘weakly segmented labour market’ (D3). The variables that have high 
negative loadings include ‘strong competition in the goods market’ (B3), ‘well developed free and open financial 
sector’ (C1) and ‘government regulated financial sector’ (C2). It is the political institutions and the financial 
institutions that are the most important ones in this factor. The only PWT variables that load positively but low are 
openness and investment. The highest negative loadings are on the initial level of GDP and population growth rate. 
The spatial correlation for the third component is 0.33. Zimbabwe is clearly an outlier here. 
 
Figure 3a: Spatial correlation between institutions and economic performance (factor 3) 
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Figure 3b: IPD scores Factor 3 (IPD-PWT) 
 
Figure 3c: PWT scores Factor 3 (IPD-PWT) 
 
B. Institutions and Geography 
 
The absolute geographic location and the endowments that countries have, are often used in studies as an ultimate 
source of growth. While some studies incorporate variables such as the latitude of the country as having a direct 
impact on growth, others use variables such as the number of frost days in a year (which are essential for creating a 
rich top soil, thus making it more agriculturally productive) as an indirect source. The absolute geography variables 
that are used for both types of studies are a large and varied set. Rather than picking out one single variable, we 
divide the Gallup et al. (1999) data set into three different groups namely, (i) soil quality  and climate zones, which 
contains – indicators referred to as GEOSOIL (ii)  attributes of physical geography, which  contains – indicators 
referred to as GEOAREA and (iii) the disease ecology of countries. In this study, we use only variables of 
GEOSOIL and GEOAREA since these are the invariable over time.  
 
IPD-GEOAREA 
 
The IPD variables that load high in the first factor are ‘socially inclusive democracy’ (with political proximity to an 
EU country) (A1) ‘security and enforcement of property rights laws’ (B1), and ‘society’s responsiveness to change 
and innovation’ (with political proximity to Japan) (A2). It is again the political institutions and a positive market 
attitude that are important here. The geography variables that load high and positive are the latitude of country 
centroid, mean distance to the nearest coastline (km), and percentage of land area within 100 km of ice-free coast, 
while mean distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (km), percentage of land area within 100 km of ice-
free coast and percentage of land area in geographical tropics load negatively on the factor. The correlation we 
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obtain here is 0.84.  From the loadings, we can see that the most important features are the latitude of the country, 
easy access to ice-free coasts and easy access to coastline or sea-navigable river (km). The scores of the factor are 
plotted in Figure 4a. Here again, we find most African countries have the lowest scores and European countries 
along with Canada and Australia score among the highest. Figure 4b maps the institutional scores and Figure 4c 
maps the GEOAREA variables. The GEOAREA clusters are tighter than clusters of institutional scores. Central and 
South Africa has the largest cluster, scoring the lowest, while Northwestern and Eastern Europe have the highest 
scores. USA and New Zealand are outliers.  The institutional clusters are much smaller and more scattered. 
 
 
Figure 4a: Spatial correlation between institutions and physical geography (factor 1) 
 
This canonical function captures the geography hypothesis that institutional development is highly correlated to a 
certain set of geographic conditions (often proxied by latitude and access to waterways and coastline) which are 
considered favourable for economic development. What we see is that the geography scores clearly set apart Sub-
Saharan Africa whereas the institutional scores are more varied. Similarly, we see that Western European 
institutional scores are slightly more varying than the geography clusters for the same region. Spain, for example, 
has an institutional score closer to the other European countries, but has a geography score closer to North Africa. 
Similarly the Neo-European countries have institutional score closer to the European ones than their geographic 
scores.    
 
Figure 4b: IPD scores Factor 1 (IPD-GEOAREA) 
 
 
Figure 4c: GEOAREA scores Factor 1 (IPD-GEOAREA) 
 
The second canonical component has a spatial correlation is 0.60. The second factor loads positively on ‘strong 
competition in the good market’ (B3), ‘government regulated financial sector’ (C1), and ‘weakly segmented labour 
market’ (D3) and strongly negatively on ‘security and enforcement of property rights laws’ (B1), and ‘security of 
contracts’ (A4). This factor stresses on the functioning of the Goods & Services market sector. The geographic 
variables that load strongly positive are mean distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (km) and latitude of 
country centroid, and negatively on mean distance to nearest coastline (km) and percentage of land area within 100 
km of ice-free coast.  This shows that availability of water transport matter the most, as in the first factor. Figure 5a 
shows the factor scores of this canonical function. 
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Figure 5a: Spatial correlation between institutions and physical geography (factor 2) 
 
Figure 5b and 5c map the scores for institutions and geography respectively, for the second canonical function. Here 
we find that the institutional clusters are larger than the geography clusters. Here we find no clear differentiation 
between developed and developing countries. Rather we find that large countries have the least institutional as well 
as geography scores, excepting those in the African continent and Russia.  
 
 
Figure 5b: IPD scores Factor 2 (IPD-GEOAREA) 
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Figure 5c: GEOAREA scores Factor 2 (IPD-GEOAREA) 
 
The third canonical component has a spatial correlation is 0.37. This factor loads positively on ‘socially inclusive 
democracy’ (with political proximity to an EU country) (A1), and ‘society’s responsiveness to change and 
innovation’ (with political proximity to Japan) (A2). It loads strongly negative on ‘strong government regulation 
and active economic policies’ (B2), ‘security and enforcement of property rights laws’ (B1), and ‘strong presence of 
government’ (A3). The geographic variables that load strongly positive are distance from centroid of country to 
nearest coast (km) and to the nearest sea-navigable river and percentage of land area within 100 km of ice-free coast. 
It loads negatively on mean distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (km). On the institutional side, we 
see that countries that have a strong presence of government have the lowest scores. Here again, we see that the 
institutional clusters are quite different from the geographical clusters. 
 
 
Figure 6a: Spatial correlation between institutions and physical geography (factor 3) 
 
(.4921,.8191]
(.3101,.4921]
(.1882,.3101]
(.1314,.1882]
(.0718,.1314]
(.0339,.0718]
(-.0284,.0339]
(-.1363,-.0284]
(-.2285,-.1363]
(-.5892,-.2285]
[-1.3015,-.5892]
No data
 
Figure 6b: IPD scores on factor 3 (IPD-GEOAREA) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6c: GEOAREA scores on factor 3 (IPD-GEOAREA) 
 
IPD-GEOSOIL 
 
The first canonical function of IPD-GEOSOIL has a correlation of 0.83.  The most significant loadings are given to 
‘socially inclusive democracy’ (with political proximity to an EU country) (A1) and ‘security and enforcement of 
property rights laws’ (B1) both of which are strongly negative while ‘non-meritocratic weak labour market’ (D1) 
loads moderately positive. On the geography side, we find that percentage of land cultivated in the Köppen Geiger 
zones of humid temperate, cold climate with moist winter and warm climate with dry summers load strongly 
negative. Very suitable-mean soil suitability (soilsui1) also loads moderately negative. Steppe climate, savannah 
climate, and moderately suitable-mean irrigation suitability (irrsuit2) load moderately positively.  Figure 7a shows 
clear clusters of countries, with Africa and South & South East Asia on the one hand and Western Europe, North 
America, North Africa and Australia on the other. We see that this component again captures the emerging 
consensus that institutional development has been shaped by geography. This stylized fact has been popularized by 
economists such as Jeffery Sachs, Jared Diamond, etc.   
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Figure 7a: Spatial correlation between institutions and soil (factor 1) 
 
From the spatial maps in Figure 7b and 7c we can see that those climatic conditions found in Western Europe that 
are considered good for overall economic development, which is in turn related to institutional development are also 
the ones that are most emphasized in the literature. Japan and New Zealand are the only other countries that score 
similar to Western Europe in Figure 7c. What is interesting to note here is that in Figure 7b we see that China scores 
low on institutions while Australia scores high. However, in Figure 7c, we see that both countries have similar 
geographic conditions. 
 
Figure 7b: IPD scores Factor 1 (IPD-GEOSOIL) 
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Figure 7c: GEOSOIL scores Factor 1 (IPD-GEOSOIL) 
 
In the second factor, ‘society’s responsiveness to change and innovation’ (with political proximity to Japan) (A2) 
has the largest loading which is strongly negative. ‘Strong presence of government in the goods and services market’ 
(B2) and ‘security and enforcement of property rights laws’ (B1) also load negative, while ’strong presence of the 
government’ (A3) loads positively. The geography variables that load high and positive include the percentage of 
land cultivated in the Köppen- Geiger zones of warm temperate climate with a dry summer, steppe climate, tropical 
savannah with dry winter and snow climate-fully humid and moderately suitable-mean soil solubility (soilsui2).  The 
spatial correlation for this canonical function is 0.63. Figure 8a shows the scatter plot of the factor scores.  
 
Figure 8a: Spatial correlation between institutions and soil (factor 2) 
 
Here again, like in the second Figures 6b and 6c, we find that the institutional clusters are larger than the geography 
clusters, especially for Europe and Africa. These second factors show that geography is not necessarily destiny. 
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Figure 8b: IPD scores Factor 2 (IPD-GEOSOIL) 
 
 
Figure 8c: GEOSOIL scores Factor 2 (IPD-GEOSOIL) 
 
In case of the third factor, we find that ‘security of contracts’ (A4) has the strongest positive loading followed by 
’society’s responsiveness to change and innovation’ (with political proximity to Japan) (A2) and ‘socially inclusive 
democracy’ (with political proximity to an EU country) (A1). The geography variables that load positive and high 
are the percentage of cultivated lands in warm temperate fully humid climate, tropical savannah, warm temperate 
climate with dry winter, steppe climate, snow fully humid climate and tropical rain forest. This factor has a spatial 
correlation of 0.6. This canonical function stresses on the political institutions only. East Asia has the highest 
institutional scores, as seen in figure 9b. The rest of Asia has the lowest scores along with North Africa and Central 
America. The geographical clusters are larger here. Like in the first function, here we find larger geographical 
clusters than institutional clusters. 
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Figure 9a: Spatial correlation between institutions and soil (factor 3) 
 
Figure 9b: IPD scores Factor 3 (IPD-GEOSOIL) 
 
 
Figure 9c: GEOSOIL scores on factor 3 (IPD-GEOSOIL) 
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C. Institutions and Financial Development (IPD-FINANCE): 
 
Finally, we have a look at the interactions between institutional variables and finance variables. Figure 10a shows 
the scatter plot of the first set of scores from IPD and FINANCE plotted against each other. The spatial correlation 
here is 0.70. For the IPD data, we find that the first component loads positively high on ‘government controlled 
financial sector’ (C2) and ‘non-meritocratic weak labour market’ (D1) and negatively on ’society’s responsiveness 
to change and innovation’ (A2), ’strong presence of the government’ (A3), ‘enforcement of property rights laws’ 
(B1) and ‘competition in the good market’ (B3). It is interesting to note that the political institutional environment 
that was very important in determining the economic environment of the country is not as important a determinant 
for the first factor.  
The FINANCE data loads positively high on the ratio of bank deposits to GDP (bdgdp) and private credit by deposit 
money banks / gdp (pcrdbgdp). The ratio of deposit money bank assets (dbagdp) and ratio of financial system 
deposits to GDP (fdgdp) load strongly negative. Fdgdp and bdgdp measure the absolute size of the financial sector 
(Beck et al 2009). While fdgdp measures the lending activities of the entire financial sector, bdgdp measures 
deposits of deposit monetary institutions. Since they are perfectly correlated, we find that if one variable loads 
positively, the other has to and does load negatively. Dbagdp and pcrdbgdp measure financial depth in the economy. 
King and Levine (1993) and Levine et al. (2000)  find that countries where deposit money banks or commercial 
banks play a bigger role in financial intermediation than central banks, there is a higher level of financial 
development. This is captured by the first component. Fdgdp is stock indicator of resources available to the financial 
sector for its lending activities, which is one indication of the size of the financial system. From the first component 
we see that those countries with a higher level of income have a higher fdgdp ratio. Those countries which have a 
low ratio of private credit from both deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP, lower ratio of 
bank deposits to GDP and ratio of overhead costs to GDP are mainly low income countries. From the first 
component we see that the size of the banking and financial sector in the economy as well as the magnitude of 
private financial sector is what matters for development. The other variables have relatively negligible weights in all 
the factors.  
Figure 10b maps the IPD scores of the first factor. From the figure we see clear clusters in the Americas and Asia 
(except for the Indian subcontinent). In Europe and Africa we find more variation. Figure 10c maps the Finance 
scores, from which we find smaller clusters, more varied across the map. 
 
 
Figure 10a: Spatial correlation between institutions and financial development (factor 1) 
 
Figure 10b: IPD scores Factor 1 (IPD-FINANCE) 
 
 
Figure 10c: FINANCE scores Factor 1 (IPD-FINANCE) 
 
The spatial correlation of the second set of factors for the IPD-FINANCE data is 0.64. From the IPD data we see 
that ’strong presence of the government’ (A3) and ‘non-meritocratic weak labour market’ (D1) load positively while 
‘socially inclusive democracy’ (A1) highly negative (-0.8402) and the fourth factor of sector A (A4) has a weight of 
-0.2284. We see that in this factor ‘Public institutions and civil society’ is the most important sector of institutions. 
However the variable ‘socially inclusive democracy’ has the largest loading. The loadings on the financial structure 
variables show that the ratio of financial system deposits to gdp (fdgdp) and the ratio of private credit by deposit 
money banks to gdp (pcrdbgdp) are positive and the ratio of bank deposits to GDP (bdgdp) are negative. No 
financial variables from the IPD are captured in this component, unlike in the case of the first factor.  
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Figure 11a: Spatial correlation between institutions and financial development (factor 2) 
 
The map of the IPD scores, Figure 11b shows a cluster of North and South America along with Western Europe. 
Australia and New Zealand also belong to this cluster and are geographically outliers.  We find small clusters in 
Africa and Asia as well. The map of finance scores shows more variety in South America as against the IPD scores. 
Africa and Asia however have larger clusters. With respect to the IPD-Finance analysis, we find that a larger 
financial sector goes hand-in-hand with a higher level of GDP in a country and that a more open financial sector 
leads to higher growth. We also find that countries with a lower level of democracy are also those which have a 
lower financial depth.  
 
 
Figure 11b: IPD scores Factor 2 (IPD-FINANCE) 
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Figure 11c: FINANCE scores Factor 2 (IPD-FINANCE) 
 
The spatial correlations for the third set of factors is relatively lower (0.44). The institutional variables that load high 
and positive are ’strong presence of the government’ (A3) and ‘competition in the good market’ (B3). Those that 
load strongly negative include ’society’s responsiveness to change and innovation’ (with political proximity to 
Japan) (A2), ‘security and enforcement of property rights laws’ (B1), and ‘non-meritocratic weak labour market’ 
(D1). From this we see that the goods and services market sector of IPD is relatively more important in this factor. 
We don’t see the financial sector of the IPD having any impact on the factor. The finance variables that load high 
and positive are the ratio of deposit money bank assets to GDP, and bank deposits to GDP.  The ratio of financial 
system deposits to GDP has a strong negative loading. Here again a competitive and open financial sector, which is 
relatively privatized is what seems to determine a high score for countries. Here too, the institutional clusters are 
stronger. 
 
Figure 12a: Spatial correlation between institutions and financial development (factor 3) 
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Figure 12b: IPD scores Factor 3 (IPD-FINANCE) 
 
 
Figure 12c: FINANCE scores Factor 1 (IPD-FINANCE) 
  
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyses institutional quality and economic performance through the lens of a spatial PCA and a spatial 
CCA. From the first canonical components of each spatial CCA we find results that conform to current literature. 
First, our analysis reiterates the institutional hypothesis that institutional quality of a country is strongly related to its 
level of GDP per capita. The more developed a country is, the better its institutional quality and vice versa, 
characterized by a high level of democracy, strong enforcement of property rights etc. (as seen in Figure 1b and 1c). 
We also get results that are consistent with the geography hypothesis. We find that higher institutional quality is 
strongly related to ‘favourable’ geographic conditions, both in the case of physical geographic conditions and soil 
quality conditions in a country (Figure 4b, 4c, 7b and 7c). Further, we find that a larger financial sector is strongly 
correlated to a higher level of GDP in particular and a higher level of economic performance in general (Figure 10b 
and 10c).  These results show that the influence of institutions varies across the levels of economic performance and 
financial performance. 
Looking at the second canonical functions (Factor 2), we find other stylized facts. Firstly, we find that catching up 
based growth is related to market steering (Figure 2b and 2c). Secondly, we find that geography does not necessarily 
define the institutional structure of countries. We find that relative influences of neighbouring countries matters and 
need not be directly related to similar geographic conditions (Figure 5b, 5c, 8b and 8c). In other words, geography is 
not destiny. Thus unlike what most studies on the relationship between geography and economic performance say, 
countries do have a choice in developing and fostering any kind of institutional set up, though they are likely to be 
influenced by their neighbours to an extent. Both relative location as well as common historical backgrounds could 
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define the institutional set up of countries. For example, Australia and New Zealand are often in the same cluster as 
Western Europe when looking at institutional quality, but not necessarily when we consider their economic 
performance, and especially when we consider geographic similarities. 
In this study, the causality of these relationships is not touched upon. This is one apparent disadvantage of the 
canonical correlation analysis. Further, the validity of these conclusions is based on the quality of the data resulting 
from a survey. It is important to keep in mind that biases are inherent to perceptions indices. However, one can still 
conclude, given the above correlations, that there is no single/global solution to address under-development and 
growth. The role of institutions in the economic performance of a country needs to be addressed at regional and 
country specific levels. Another drawback of this study is that it uses a cross-section of data. Institutions evolve over 
long periods of time, and are highly dependent on the historical socio-political and economic events of a country. To 
analyse the quality of institutions at a single point in time can be limiting. For example, the under-development of 
certain parts of the world in the process of the development of Europe in the colonial era cannot be discounted in 
understanding growth processes today. However, the lack of time-series data limits us to looking at a snap-shot 
picture of the current institutional set up across countries. 
 
These results show us that we need to first understand the multi-dimensional nature of institutions before 
understanding their impact on or by the other factors discussed above. We find that similar geographic environment 
can lead to different institutional environment and also to different economic performance. Furthermore, there is a 
need to understand them in a spatial context as seen from the above results. While there is a lot of empirical work in 
the area, there is also a need for more theoretical understanding of this multi-dimensionality of institutions. Most 
theoretical attempts until now have been based in a very Europe-centric framework. In order to fully understand 
economic growth and development in the context of institutional quality, we need to look beyond theories that 
explain the development of the now developed countries. Our results show that spatial clusters are not always based 
on the level of economic development of countries. This is one major drawback which hinders current policy 
effectiveness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix A: Weights matrix 
 
We choose a set of geographic distance weights for the connectivity matrix. We use an exponential distance decay 
function to obtain the weights matrix, given by the formula, ݓ௜௝ ൌ ݁ି଴.଴଴ଵହௗ೔ೕ	where wij is the spatial weight between 
countries i and j, and dij is the bilateral distance between the centroids of the two countries i and j. The choice of the 
connectivity matrix has implications on the results obtained from the empirical analysis (Ward and Gleditsch 2007). 
Other types of connectivity matrices include binary contiguity matrices, bilateral trade matrices etc.26.   
We describe our choice using the Example of India. India’s immediate neighbours (those that share a border with it) 
include: Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar (Burma), Sri Lanka and Afghanistan (in the 
disputed area). Tajikistan, Thailand, Iran, Vietnam etc. are further away. The question then becomes one of how 
much weight should Thailand and Vietnam get, to depict the influence they exert on India. We choose that distance 
decay measure that gives importance to immediate neighbours. The weights given to Vietnam are significantly 
lower and those give to Australia get an insignificant weight. Figure (i) shows the decay in graphical terms for India 
with respect to Pakistan, Vietnam and Australia. The steeper the fall of the curve, the higher is the decay, i.e., 
relatively closer countries also exert lesser influence on the given country. In our case, we find that the nearest 
neighbours already have a fairly low weight. Since we consider distance between centroids of countries we note that 
larger countries tend to give lower weights to neighbours than smaller countries. Figure (ii) shows the effect of each 
of these distance decay values have on the summary statistics on the spatial lag, and in turn on the spatial correlation 
of a row-standardized weights matrix.  
  
                                                          
26 For more details on connectivity matrices and their effects on weight matrices and in turn on the empirical results can be found in Ward and 
Gleditsch 2007. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix B- IPD categories 
 
 
A. Public Institutions & Civil 
Society
B. Goods and Services 
Markets C. Capital Markets
D. Labour Markets & 
Labour Relations
Democracy, Legality and Freedom a10 Freedom of association and 
trade union pluralism
d10
Political stability and Legitimacy a11
Decentralization a12
Domestic public security and 
Control of violence
a20
Control of State violence by NGOs a21
External security a22
Governance of public 
administration and the justice 
a30 Ease of starting a business b30
Autonomy of public policies a31 Importance of the Economic b31
Donors' influence a32 Consideration of public 
interest in government-
b32
Autonomy in operation and 
creation of organizations
a33 Governance of natural 
resources
b33
Government capacity to reform a34
Fiscal exemptions a35
Privatizations b40 Privatizations in the financial 
sector
c40 Flexibility in the labour market d40
Nationalizations b41 Nationalizations in the financial 
sector
c41 Retraining and reskilling 
measures
d41
Governance of privatizations b42 Freedom in the allocation of 
loans
c42
Performance of public 
organizations
b43
Freedom of prices b44
Single exchange rate b45
Capacity of the State to 
coordinate stakeholders
a50 Technological environment b50 Competence of bank 
executives
c50 Adaptive education system d50
Strategic capacities a51 Public aid for R&D b51 Importance of venture capital c51
Government's arbitration capacity a52 Density of sub-contracting 
relations
b52 Sovereign wealth fund policy c52
Institutional capacity a53
Government political capacity a54
Change, Innovation a55
Cooperative behaviour in society a56
Outlook of young people a57
Security of transactions and a60 Information on G&S markets b60 Financial information c60 Respect for workers' rights d60
Government respect for contracts a61 Rural land tenure: traditional 
property
b61 Weak employment contrat 
rigidity
d61
Frequency of bankruptcy a62 Rural land tenure: public b62
Enforcement of bankruptcy law a63 Diversity of land tenure rights 
systems
b63
Government recognition of 
diversity of land tenure rights 
b64
Land tenure: security of b65
Land tenure: demand for land b66
Land tenure and large b67
Competition on G&S markets b70 Competition within the banking 
system
c70 Wage bargaining at the 
individual level
d70
Shareholders: weight of the 
government
b71 Regulation of competition in 
banking
c71 Strikes d71
Information on shareholders b72 Monitoring and auditing in 
banking
c72 Management of labour d72
Land tenure: development b73 Reform of financial regulations c73
Free movement of people and 
information
a80 Openness to business b80 Financial openness c80 Openness to employment of 
non-nationals
d80
Political proximity with big Joint Ventures b81
Emulation with neighboring a82 Non-national access to land b82
National sense of identity a90 Micro lending c90 Quality of the supply of public 
goods
d90
National cohesion a91 Weak segmentation of the 
labour market
d91
Strenghening of middle classes a92 Low incidence of child labour d92
Social inclusion a93 Social mobility d93
Traditional solidarity a94 Social mobility: young higher 
education graduates
d94
Subsidies on commodities a95f Distribution of income d95
6 - Security of 
Transactions and 
Contracts
7 -Market regulation, 
Social Dialogue
8 - Openess to the 
Outside World
9 - Social Cohesion
1- Political Institutions
2 - Security, Law and 
Order
3 - Functioning of Public 
Administrations
4 - Free Operation of 
Markets
5 - Coordination of 
Stakeholders and 
Strategic visions
Appendix C: Description of Variables 
 
Variable Description Dataset 
LY00 GDP per capita, 2000, in intl. dollars PWT 
GR GDP per capita, annual average growth rate 2000-2007 PWT 
I Investment share of PPP converted GDP per capita PWT 
G Government expenditure share of PPP converted GDP per capita PWT 
OP Net exports share of PPP converted GDP per capita PWT 
LPOP Population, average over the period 2000-2009 PWT 
C consumption share of PPP converted GDP per capita PWT 
areakm2 land area (km2) GEOAREA 
cen_lat latitude of country centroid GEOAREA 
elev mean elevation (meters above sea level) GEOAREA 
distcr mean distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (km) GEOAREA 
distc mean distance to nearest coastline (km) GEOAREA 
distr mean distance to nearest inland navigable river (km) GEOAREA 
cen_c distance from centroid of country to nearest coast (km) GEOAREA 
cen_cr distance from centroid of country to nearest coast or sea-navigable river km) GEOAREA 
lc100km % Land area within 100 km of ice-free coast GEOAREA 
lcr100km % Land area within 100 km of ice-free coast (or navigable river) GEOAREA 
tropicar % Land area in geographical tropics GEOAREA 
soilsui1 mean soil suitability 1, very suitable (%) GEOAREA 
soilsui2 mean soil suitability 2, moderately suitable (%) GEOAREA 
irrsuit1 Mean irrigation suitability, very suitable (%)  GEOAREA 
irrsuit2 Mean irrigation suitability, moderately suitable (%) GEOAREA 
cultmaf % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Af zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmam % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Am zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmaw % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Aw zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmbs % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Bs zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmbw % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Bw zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmcf % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Cf zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmcs % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Cs zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmcw % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Cw zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmdf % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Df zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmdw % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Dw zone  GEOSOIL 
cultme % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger E zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmh % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger H zone  GEOSOIL 
dbacba Deposit Money Bank Assets / (Deposit Money + Central) Bank Assets FINANCE 
llgdp Liquid Liabilities / GDP FINANCE 
cbagdp Central Bank Assets / GDP FINANCE 
dbagdp Deposit Money Bank Assets / GDP FINANCE 
pcrdbgdp Private Credit By Deposit Money Banks / GDP FINANCE 
pcrdbofgdp Private Credit By Deposit Money Banks And Other Financial Institutions / GDP FINANCE 
bdgdp Bank Deposits / GDP FINANCE 
fdgdp Financial System Deposits / GDP FINANCE 
bcbd Bank Credit / Bank Deposits FINANCE 
overhead Bank Overhead Costs / Total Assets FINANCE 
netintmargin Net Interest Margin FINANCE 
concentration Bank Concentration FINANCE 
Variable Description Dataset 
roa Bank ROA FINANCE 
roe Bank ROE FINANCE 
costinc Bank Cost-Income Ratio FINANCE 
zscore Bank Z-Score FINANCE 
nrbloan Loans From Non-Resident Banks (Amt Outstanding) / GDP FINANCE 
offdep Offshore Bank Deposits / Domestic Bank Deposits FINANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix D: Factor Loadings on IPD variables (First Stage) 
 
Sector A 
  Variable Description A_mspc1 A_mspc2 A_mspc3 A_mspc4 
A10 Democracy, Legality and Freedom 0.3152 -0.044 -0.2097 0.0212 
A11 Political stability and Legitimacy -0.1679 0.1504 -0.0952 0.0314 
A12 Decentralisation 0.1112 -0.1891 -0.2707 0.1913 
A20 Domestic public security and Control of violence -0.028 0.1732 0.2465 0.1358 
A21 Control of State violence by NGOs 0.023 0.0969 0.051 -0.2903 
A22 External security -0.0576 -0.1279 0.0236 0.0985 
A30 Governance of public administration and the justice system 0.1334 -0.3579 0.2562 -0.2996 
A31 Autonomy of public policies -0.0692 0.1265 0.1068 -0.0114 
A32 Donors' influence 0.0365 -0.0311 0.0169 0.0915 
A33 Autonomy in operation and creation of organisations -0.0644 -0.2088 0.1485 0.1997 
A34 Government capacity to reform 0.1149 -0.2476 -0.4647 -0.1155 
A35 Fiscal exemptions 0.0893 0.0013 -0.0245 0.0402 
A50 Capacity of the State to coordinate stakeholders 0.0764 0.0946 0.1469 0.2406 
A51 Strategic capacities -0.1537 -0.1231 -0.0242 -0.223 
A52 Government's arbitration capacity -0.0538 0.0861 0.0775 0.0947 
A53 Institutional capacity 0.037 0.1769 0.1357 0.2138 
A54 Government political capacity 0.0443 -0.0729 -0.0072 -0.118 
A55 Change, Innovation -0.2244 0.4501 0.2883 0.1008 
A56 Cooperative behaviour in society -0.0932 0.0186 0.1724 -0.0716 
A57 Outlook of young people -0.0432 0.0061 0.1432 0.1307 
A60 Security of transactions and contracts -0.1139 0.2703 -0.0983 0.3528 
A61 Government respect for contracts 0.0136 -0.0536 -0.0899 0.0086 
A62 Frequency of bankruptcy 0.0502 -0.1086 -0.052 0.0425 
A63 Enforcement of bankruptcy law 0.0277 -0.0805 0.0141 -0.0074 
A80 Free movement of people and information -0.0589 0.0358 -0.0988 0.1371 
A8010 Political proximity with  USA 0.0104 0.1287 0.0758 -0.0382 
A8011 Political proximity with  an EU country 0.3398 -0.3352 0.0075 -0.3613 
A8012 Political proximity with  Japan -0.1893 0.2258 0.0432 0.0569 
A8013 Political proximity with  China -0.0872 0.0055 0.2162 0.1288 
A82 Emulation with neighbouring countries 0.0206 0.1615 -0.0019 -0.0139 
A90 National sense of identity -0.0189 0.0857 -0.0563 0.125 
A91 National cohesion -0.0543 -0.111 -0.2794 -0.0754 
A92 Strengthening of middle classes 0.0381 -0.0169 0.1111 0.003 
A93 Social inclusion 0.6866 0.0348 0.1784 -0.3662 
A94 Traditional solidarity -0.1157 0.0572 0.2386 -0.0754 
A95f Subsidies on commodities 0.2017 -0.1924 -0.2161 -0.1719 
 
  
Sector B 
IPD Variable Variable Description B1 B2 B3 
B30 Ease of starting a business 0.1493 -0.2875 0.134 
B31 Importance of the Economic zones -0.0581 0.3448 -0.291 
B32 Consideration of public interest in government-business relations -0.1657 0.2344 -0.1635 
B33 Governance of natural resources 0.0596 -0.0041 -0.1982 
B40 Privatisations 0.2403 -0.1203 0.2834 
B41 Nationalisations 0.2046 -0.1175 0.0058 
B42 Governance of privatisations -0.0012 -0.1228 0.1439 
B43 Performance of public organisations 0.1198 0.0989 0.0031 
B44 Freedom of prices 0.0926 -0.1119 -0.0488 
B45 Single exchange rate -0.0281 -0.0955 0.1305 
B50 Technological environment 0.249 0.3117 0.0456 
B51 Public aid for R&D -0.0651 -0.2377 0.1204 
B52 Density of sub-contracting relations 0.1326 -0.2395 0.0017 
B60 Information on G&S markets 0.2 0.031 0.1038 
B61 Rural land tenure: traditional property -0.3423 -0.2251 0.0548 
B62 Rural land tenure: public property -0.1466 -0.0065 -0.1727 
B63 Diversity of land tenure rights systems 0.1445 0.0081 -0.061 
B64 Government recognition of diversity of land tenure rights systems -0.1606 -0.0675 -0.1109 
B65 Land tenure: security of ownership 0.3153 0.2348 0.1814 
B66 Land tenure: demand for land 0.1838 -0.0004 0.2013 
B67 Land tenure and large investors -0.0805 0.1109 -0.0997 
B70 Competition on G&S markets -0.132 0.0535 -0.6298 
B71 Shareholders: weight of the government 0.0345 0.2188 0.1918 
B72 Information on shareholders 0.0755 -0.3091 0.2116 
B73 Land tenure: development policies 0.1072 -0.1641 0.1125 
B80 Openness to business -0.0083 0.1836 0.2 
B81 Joint Ventures 0.306 0.1094 -0.0458 
B82 Non-national access to land -0.4915 -0.3394 -0.1356 
 
  
Sector C 
IPD Variable Variable Description C1 C2 
C40 Privatisations in the financial sector 0.0595 -0.0467 
C41 Nationalisations in the financial sector 0.1985 -0.0939 
C42 Freedom in the allocation of loans 0.1531 -0.3117 
C50 Competence of bank executives 0.1356 0.2854 
C51 Importance of venture capital 0.368 -0.3331 
C52 Sovereign wealth fund policy -0.1862 0.5076 
C60 Financial information -0.3638 -0.0751 
C70 Competition within the banking system -0.1536 -0.0024 
C71 Regulation of competition in banking 0.4207 0.2234 
C72 Monitoring and auditing in banking 0.3515 0.3023 
C73 Reform of financial regulations 0.0707 -0.0965 
C80 Financial openness 0.3052 0.2545 
C90 Micro lending -0.4364 0.4699 
 
 
Sector D 
IPD Variable Variable Description D1 D2 D3 
D10 Freedom of association and trade union pluralism 0.2443 -0.4614 0.1625 
D40 Flexibility in the labour market -0.0765 -0.3393 -0.0836 
D41 Retraining and reskilling measures -0.1675 -0.003 -0.0593 
D50 Adaptive education system 0.0027 -0.2803 0.0394 
D60 Respect for workers' rights -0.0871 0.0819 0.0529 
D61 Weak employment contrat rigidity -0.1747 0.3401 -0.0011 
D70 Wage bargaining at the individual level 0.0235 0.2155 -0.1371 
D71 Strikes -0.0806 0.2255 0.3431 
D72 Management of labour -0.2551 -0.1942 0.2904 
D80 Openness to employment of non-nationals -0.1283 -0.1238 -0.1059 
D90 Quality of the supply of public goods 0.0617 0.226 -0.3641 
D91 Weak segmentation of the labour market -0.1874 -0.1019 0.2309 
D92 Low incidence of child labour -0.6413 0.4341 0.4832 
D93 Social mobility -0.5463 0.0561 -0.3529 
D94 Social mobility: young higher education graduates 0.0135 0.2443 -0.2891 
D95 Distribution of income 0.1754 0.0892 -0.3149 
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